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Occupational Choice, Aggregate Productivity, and Trade
* 
 
We propose occupational decisions of heterogeneous individuals as an alternative 
mechanism of explaining the distribution of firm productivities emphasized by empirical 
studies. Thus, we integrate the frameworks of Melitz (2003), and of Manasse and Turrini 
(2001) that establish the theoretical base of trade models with heterogeneous firms. Our 
model is technically much simpler than the Melitz approach while preserving the main results 
on firm-selection effects due to international market integration. Our approach paves the way 
for detailed analysis of institutions in a heterogeneous firm model to better understand the 
link between institutions and an economy’s productivity distribution. 
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The literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms emphasizes the eﬀects of ﬁrms’ self selec-
tion in response to trade liberalization. Three eﬀects are identiﬁed as typical
reactions to product markets becoming increasingly integrated: (i) highly pro-
ductive ﬁrms that already have been exporting before expand; (ii) additional
medium–productive ﬁrms will become exporters; (iii) low productive ﬁrms exit
the market (cf., e.g., Economidou and Murshid, 2008). The most popular theo-
retical explanation of these ﬁrm–selection eﬀects is Melitz (2003). In his model
of heterogeneous ﬁrms the equilibrium number of active ﬁrms is endogenously
determined as result of a dynamic market entry game. By entering markets ﬁrms
make an irreversible investment to discover their speciﬁc productivity. After re-
alizing their productivity, a ﬁrm decides whether to concentrate on its domestic
market, to be active on both national and international markets, or to exit.
Despite its formal elegance and although it constitutes the fundamental base
in the literature on heterogeneous–ﬁrms trade models (cf. Bernard, Jensen, Red-
ding and Schott, 2007), the application of Melitz’s approach is aﬄicted to the
following drawbacks. (i) Due to the complexity of the dynamic market–entry
game, Melitz restricts his analysis to steady–state equilibria. This constitutes a
severe limitation of his model especially with respect to practical applications of
his results (this primarily applies to welfare results). (ii) The assignment of pro-
ductivities to ﬁrms is modeled as a highly abstract process—ﬁrms simply draw
their productivity from a pool of productivities—that is hardly open to economic
interpretation. Additionally, in order to generate a distribution of ﬁrm produc-
tivities that is in accord with the empirically observations, this distribution of
productivities has to be speciﬁed appropriately.1
The Melitz model has been simpliﬁed to alleviate issues resulting from draw-
back (i). Chaney (2008) and Do and Levchenko (2009), e.g., replace Melitz’s
modelling of a dynamic market–entry game with an inﬁnite mass of entrants by
assuming a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms that are either active or inactive. Their simpli-
1The Melitz model has been successfully extended by introducing speciﬁc institutions (Hiep
and Hiroshi, 2007) or special characteristics of product markets (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008;
Arkolakis, 2011) or labor markets (Helpman and Itshoki, 2010; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009).
All of these extensions, however, typically postulate a speciﬁc distribution of ﬁrm productivities
in order to reconcile the implications of their models with observed productivity distributions.
1ﬁcation of the original approach is warranted to allow for introduction of further
complexities arising from important economic–geography or political–economy
issues. Given that speciﬁc focus of their approach, however, tackling problems
arising from issue (ii) is dispensable. Our model aims at extending the model
along the lines of problem (ii), and it tries to shed light on the process of evolv-
ing ﬁrm productivities which by construction provides another way so simplify
the market entry process in (i). Thus, our contribution is to simplify the Melitz
(2003) model in speciﬁc a way while at the same time establishing a link between
ﬁrm productivities and abilities of heterogeneous individuals.
We develop a mechanism explaining the distribution of productivities that is
based on the occupational choices of heterogeneous individuals. In doing so, we
integrate the models developed by Melitz (2003) and a more restricted predecessor
of his approach proposed by Manasse and Turrini (2001) that concentrates only
on the exporting decision of an existing mass of ﬁrms. We will follow Manasse and
Turrini and link ﬁrm productivities to abilities of heterogeneous individuals that
operate these ﬁrms. We extend the Manasse–Turrini approach by endogenizing
the number of active ﬁrms and an economy’s supply of labor by the occupational
choice of these individuals. Thereby we preserve the static character of the model
and we provide a plausible link between individual innate abilities and ﬁrm pro-
ductivities. As a result, we provide an alternative theoretical foundation to all
ﬁrm selection eﬀects emphasized by the empirical literature while preserving the
simplicity of a static model. Due to this simplicity and its link between ﬁrm pro-
ductivities and productivities of heterogeneous individuals (workers), the model
could serve as a framework for a detailed description of the interplay between edu-
cation and human capital investment, labor market institutions and the resulting
distribution of productivities of active ﬁrms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In
section 3 we characterize the equilibrium in a symmetric two–country setting. In
section 4 we derive the implications of trade liberalization. Section 5 discusses the
relation between the distribution of individual abilities and observed distribution
of ﬁrm productivities implied by our model. Finally, section 6 concludes with
some remarks on possible applications and extensions of our basic framework.
22 The Model












where c(j) denotes consumption of product variety j, and the measure of set
J represents the mass of available goods; σ denotes the constant elasticity of
substitution between any two goods. Due to the homotheticity of the utility
function, we can derive aggregate demand from the problem of a representative












where p(i) is the price of variety i and P is the price index deﬁned over prices of
varieties.
Production requires the employment of two factors: entrepreneurial or man-
agerial skills and raw labor. The size of a ﬁrm is normalized such that one ﬁrm
employs the skills of one entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs are assumed to be hetero-
geneous with respect to their skills, and each entrepreneur can employ her skills
in the production of at most one variety. Production technology is represented
by a cost function with constant marginal costs. As in Melitz (2003), higher pro-
ductivity is modelled as producing a symmetric product variety at lower variable
cost. Hence, a ﬁrm’s demand for raw labor l is assumed to be linear in its output
x: l = x/q, where q denotes the ﬁrm–speciﬁc productivity level. We follow Man-
asse and Turrini (2001) and assume that the skills of the entrepreneur determines
the productivity of the ﬁrm; speciﬁcally, we assume that a ﬁrms productivity q
and the entrepreneur’s ability a are related by q = a. Eventually, each ﬁrm faces
a residual demand curve with constant elasticity σ, and a wage rate for raw labor
w.
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals of mass L. Indi-
viduals are heterogeneous with respect to their innate abilities a. Abilities are
distributed according to some continuous and diﬀerentiable density function g(a)
with support [0,∞); the respective distribution function is denoted by G(a). An
3individual with ability a can choose to enter the labor force and supply one unit
of raw labor at the wage w. Alternatively, an individual can choose to become
an entrepreneur and found a ﬁrm. In that case her income is her ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
Of course, the wage income of labor is the opportunity cost of becoming an en-
trepreneur. The self selection of individuals endogenizes the economy’s supply
of raw labor. In case of a ∈ [t,∞) individuals becoming entrepreneurs (t > 0),
aggregate labor supply is given by LS(t) = G(t)L. Consequently, the mass of
active domestic ﬁrms is given by M(t) = [1 − G(t)]L.
3 The Two–Country Equilibrium
We analyze the interdependence of trade and occupational choice of individuals
in a two–country model. As common in the literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms,
we assume that trade is associated with ﬁxed costs fX > 0 in order to generate
self–selection of ﬁrms with respect to exporting. These costs measure exporters’
costs to set up and maintain distributional channels in the foreign market. They
take the form of output that has to be produced but cannot be sold. Furthermore,
we assume that export incurs additional variable costs taking the form of iceberg
transportation costs: for one unit of an export good to arrive, τ > 1 units have to
be produced and shipped. Speciﬁcally, we assume τf
1/(σ−1)
X > 1 for self selection
to occur in equilibrium. If this regularity condition holds, proﬁts from exporting
are just additional proﬁts for ﬁrms that are already active on their domestic
market.
In order to simplify the analysis, we follow Melitz (2003) and Manasse and
Turrini (2001) and concentrate on the case of two symmetrical countries. Symme-
try of both countries allows us to consider the equilibrium allocation and prices
in one country. Note that symmetry does not imply that countries are completely
identical. Since some ﬁrms will only serve their home market while each ﬁrm of
both countries produces a diﬀerent variety of the diﬀerentiated good, the varieties
available to consumers diﬀer between countries. Aggregate variables—wages, ag-
gregate income and expenditures, price indices—, however, will be identical in
both countries in equilibrium.
We solve for the equilibrium in our model by deriving a threshold ability t
for individuals opening up a ﬁrm, and another threshold s > t for domestic ﬁrms
4becoming exporters. Individuals with abilities a < t then will supply raw labor.
We ﬁrst look at the threshold for establishing a ﬁrm is determined by proﬁts






Proﬁts from home markets are then given by






An individual with ability a becomes an entrepreneur as her proﬁts from en-
trepreneurial activities exceed the wage rate. Making use of the clearing of prod-
uct markets and applying the markup pricing according to (3), we obtain,for













Having established a ﬁrm, exporting is an additional option for the entrepreneur.
She will engage in trade if proﬁts from exporting (net of ﬁx costs of exporting)
are positive. In order to obtain net proﬁts of a ﬁrm with productivity q = a from
exporting, let xX(a) denote the export quantity of ﬁrm a sold at export price
pX(a). Proﬁt maximization for the export activity yields the markup–pricing





The corresponding export proﬁts πX can be written as:





− wfX . (7)
A ﬁrm will now engage in trade if πX(a) is non–negative. Applying the market–
clearing condition on export markets and making use of the symmetry of the
model (identical aggregate variables), we obtain, for given values of w, E, and P,
















5Comparing the two threshold conditions (8) and (5), we ﬁnd that




Due to our regularity condition, b > 1 and hence s > t.2
In order to solve for the equilibrium, we determine the macroeconomic vari-
ables (w,E,P). The mass of domestically produced varieties is given by M(t) =
[1 − G(t)]L while that of imported varieties amounts to M(bt) = [1 − G(bt)]L.
Thus, the total number of varieties available to consumers is given by [2−G(t)−
G(bt)]L. For a given threshold value t, the price index P containing domestic















































We ﬁnally have to solve for w/E. Aggregate income is made up from aggregate
proﬁts and aggregate wages. Aggregate proﬁts comprise proﬁts from domestic
sales and from exports. Applying our deﬁnitions of the diﬀerent proﬁts, aggregate
proﬁts are given by
Π(a,w,τ,E,P) = (1 − ρ)E − wfX[1 − G(bt)]L
Adding the wage income of workers wG(t)L and rearranging terms we get
ρE
wL
= G(t) − [1 − G(bt)]fX . (12)
2Melitz applies a similar regularity condition to ensure self–selection of ﬁrms. If the regularity
condition is not satisﬁed, all ﬁrms export and the threshold for becoming an entrepreneur is
determined by [p(a) − w/a][x(a) + τxX(a)] = w(1 + fX).
6Substitution for this term in (11) gives
t = φ(t) := (σ − 1)
1
σ−1 [G(t) − [1 − G(bt)]fX]
1
1−σ Q(t). (13)
Since φ(t) > 0 and φ′(t) < 0 for all t ∈ (0,∞), (13) implies a unique solution
t ∈ (0,∞). The exporting threshold is then given by s = bt. Note that both
thresholds (s,t) are functions of the parameters (τ,fX,σ) while country size is
irrelevant for the threshold values.3
4 Impact of Trade Liberalization
Trade liberalization is interpreted as increased exposure to trade (symmetrical
for both countries) and will be modeled as a decline in transportation costs τ. As
shown in the appendix, we get the following results: dt/dτ < 0 and ds/dτ > 0.
As with trade liberalization in the Melitz model, the number of active ﬁrms de-
creases while the number of exporters rises. However, the interpretation of results
diﬀer slightly from Melitz. In the present model, fewer individuals choose to be-
come entrepreneurs thereby reducing the number of ﬁrms while at the same time
aggregate labor employment rises. The intuition for this result is straightfor-
ward. As transportation costs decline, the demand for exports rises due to the
change in relative prices of the diﬀerentiated products. Hence exporting becomes
proﬁtable for some ﬁrms that only served home markets before, and these ﬁrms
expand their production. Additionally, incumbent exporters face higher demand
and also expand their export production. The resulting additional demand for
labor is in parts met by the increase in labor supply as fewer individuals invest
in education. Additionally, ﬁrms serving only the home markets reduce their
production and also compensate for the rise in labor demand.
5 Distribution of Firm Productivities
By linking ﬁrm productivities to some measure of entrepreneurial abilities our
model provides an alternative channel to explain the observed distribution of pro-
ductivities. Empirical studies (cf., e.g., Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano, 2006)
3Note that Manasse and Turrini (2001) can be interpreted as a special case of our model
where t is given exogenously.
7ﬁnd that the distribution of ﬁrms’ productivities can be reasonably well approxi-
mated by a Pareto distribution. Therefore, many extensions or applications of the
Melitz model (for an overview see Helpman, 2006) simply postulate productivities
to be distributed that way. This is a completely ad–hoc assumption without any
deeper foundation. In our model, a reasonable approximation of the distribution
of productivities can be traced back to the distribution of the individuals’ innate
abilities. The literature on psychology established that the distribution of inher-
ent abilities can be well approximated by a normal distribution (cf. Wechsler
1936). Applying that argument to the present model implies the following: As
long as the threshold t is suﬃciently high (more speciﬁcally: as long as t lies to
the right of the peak of the distribution, i.e.: as long as not more than half of the
workers become entrepreneurs), the normal distribution of abilities generates a
reasonably well approximation to the observed distribution of productivities. This
result holds even if ﬁrm productivity and entrepreneurial abilities are not related
1 to 1, as assumed in the above analysis of the model, but by some monotoni-
cally increasing function; the latter may be important if abilities are transformed
into productivities by education (see below). As a result, our approach allows
to substitute for the ad–hoc assumption of Pareto–distributed productivities in
the market–entry game by an empirically well approved assumption about the
distribution of abilities.
6 Conclusions
This paper has developed an alternative mechanism of explaining the distribu-
tion of productivities across ﬁrms and their self–selection with respect to export
activities. The mechanism is based on the occupational choices of heterogeneous
individuals. Thus, we integrate the models developed by Manasse and Turrini
(2001) and by Melitz (2003). The analysis has shown that the impact of trade
liberalization on the self–selection of ﬁrms is robust with respect to the source of
ﬁrms’ productivity diﬀerentials.
Our main contribution is to simplify the analytical framework of Melitz type
models by reducing it to a static model. With respect to assigning productivities
to ﬁrms we substitute for Melitz’s very abstract lottery with ﬁrms drawing pro-
ductivities randomly from an arbitrarily speciﬁed distribution of productivities by
8an economically intuitive explanation of the emergence of persistent productivity
diﬀerentials. In this end, we provide a plausible foundation for the observed dis-
tribution of ﬁrm productivities that grounds on the distribution of innate abilities
of individuals.
By reducing the Melitz model to a static model a number of important exten-
sion to the model are possible without making it analytically intractable. Due to
its analytical simplicity, our model provides a convenient framework for integra-
tion of labor–market imperfections into heterogeneous–ﬁrms models (cf. Egger
and Kreickemeier, 2008). Because of its static character, the model allows for
a more comprehensive interpretation of welfare results from trade liberalization
that is not limited to steady states (cf. Baldwin and Forslid, 2010). On the other
hand, the model opens up the possibility of analyzing the link between endoge-
nous growth and trade liberalization based on q–theory approaches (cf. Baldwin
and Forslid, 2000, or Albert and Meckl, 1998).
Eventually, the model can be easily extended to include important institu-
tional aspects aﬀecting the distribution of productivities and thus a country’s
average productivity. Instead of a simple linear relationship between productiv-
ities and innate abilities one may explicitly introduce institutions by modeling
a relationship q = F(a;I) between ﬁrm productivities and innate abilities as
well as an economy’s institutional frame work I. This will pave the way for an
analysis of policies manipulating the distribution of productivities by educational
policies, such as educational subsidies or improvements in the educational tech-
nology. Eventually, we can trace back the diﬀerences in productivities—and hence
comparative advantage (cf. Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2007)—to diﬀerences
in the quality of labor inputs and thus on institutional diﬀerences in national
educational systems. As indicated by empirical analyses of augmented neoclas-
sical trade models (cf. Treﬂer, 1995), such quality diﬀerences are important in
understanding trade patterns. However, institutional diﬀerences are not limited
to the productivity generating mechanism but may also include industrial policies
interacting with entrepreneurial decision of individuals.
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Appendix
The appendix contains details of the comparative–static analysis of our two–
country model. We apply the following two–equation description of the equilib-
rium to derive the comparative–static eﬀects of a change in τ:
Y1(s,t,τ) := t − (σ − 1)
1
σ−1A(s,t)Z(s,t,τ) = 0 (A.1)
Y2(s,t,τ) := s − τf
1
σ−1
X (σ − 1)
1
σ−1 A(s,t)Z(s,t,τ) = 0, (A.2)
where





















































Since all partial derivatives of A and Z with respect to the thresholds (s,t) are




= tz1 > 0,
∂Y1
∂t
= 1 + tz2 > 0,
∂Y2
∂s
= 1 + sz1 > 0,
∂Y2
∂t





















































where ∂Y1/∂τ < 0 follows from τ1−σ R ∞
s aσ−1dG(a) < Zσ−1.









































The inequality follows from z1 < 1/s + z1 and 1/t + z2 > z2.




























The signs are determined by (A.3)–(A.6).
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